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WHOSE FAULT IN AN AGING WORLD?:
COMPARING DEMENTIA-RELATED TORT LIABILITY
IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
Trevor Ryan†
Wendy Bonython‡
Abstract: Age-related dementias have been identified as a global health priority,
based on their rapidly rising incidence and associated economic burden. Behaviors
symptomatic of dementias, such as wandering, potentially expose sufferers to increased
likelihood of experiencing harm or causing harms to others. Yet what jurisprudence and
case law exists on the issue of tortious liability of people with dementia is largely derived
from the broader principles governing tortious liability of those with mental illness or
otherwise impaired capacity. Those principles are themselves problematic, reflecting
absolutist models of either personal liability (common law jurisdictions) or statutory
personal immunity accompanied by imposition of delegated liability on caregivers (civil
law jurisdictions), rather than a more nuanced model capable of reflecting the fluctuating
nature of capacity in people with dementia, and the variety of models of care arrangements.
Similarly, those principles fail to adequately address tensions between paternalism and
individual autonomy. This Article provides a comparison of the various models of personal
or caregiver liability found in a number of key jurisdictions (primarily Japan and the United
States) and offers some suggestions for jurisdictions considering legal reform in this
increasingly critical area.
Cite as: Trevor Ryan & Wendy Bonython, Whose Fault In An Aging World?: Comparing
Dementia-Related Tort Liability in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions, 27 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 407 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Dementia—defined broadly as a “clinical syndrome of cognitive
decline that is sufficiently severe to interfere with social or occupational
functioning”1—presents significant challenges at all levels of society,
including for the affected individual, family and friends, caregivers, and
greater communities. It is a condition that highlights the tensions between a
paternalistic societal compulsion to protect individuals from harm to
themselves or others and the human rights-mandated autonomy of the
individual—including risk taking. At the forefront of these challenges is
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1
Howard Chertkow et al., Definitions of Dementia and Predementia States in Alzheimer’s Disease
and Vascular Cognitive Impairment: Consensus from the Canadian Conference on Diagnosis of Dementia,
5 (Suppl 1) ALZHEIMER’S RES. & THERAPY S2 (2013).
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dementia’s effect on legal personhood, aspects of which include decisionmaking ability and culpability.
In 2012, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) identified dementia
as a global health priority. Its costs to health systems alone were estimated at
$604 billion USD per year, a figure that will inevitably increase as the world’s
population ages further given the increasing incidence of dementia later in
life.2 The WHO demanded “sustained action and coordination . . . across
multiple levels and with all stakeholders—at international, national, regional
and local levels.”3 The non-economic impact is harder to quantify, yet it is
clear that the challenges presented by the increasing disease burden of
dementia affect caregivers and communities significantly. In seeking to meet
these challenges, many jurisdictions increasingly favor informal models of
care (which are provided altruistically by family members), or alternative
models of community-based care over institutionalized alternatives. These
models have the advantage of being more consistent with the human rights of
the patient than older models, which rely more extensively on involuntary
mechanisms of containment and control. The greater presence in the
community of persons with reduced capacity does, however, raise a number
of challenges.
One challenge is that harm may arise from behaviors such as
wandering: the movement of a person with dementia away from their care
environment without the knowledge of caregivers. Wandering may cause the
individual harm when the person becomes disoriented and lost and, in severe
cases, injury or death can result from exposure, attacks by animals, collisions
with vehicles, and other risks.4 Wandering can also lead to the violation of
personal and property rights of others, triggering litigation against the
wandering person. In jurisdictions where an ongoing mental impairment such
as dementia is regarded as a defense to tortious liability, the person legally or
actually responsible for his or her care may be sued. In cases where the person
who wanders is in formal protective care, such as a nursing home, that liability
can also be borne by the facility if its policies and practices for patient
containment are found to be inadequate.5 Even without wandering, harms
2

WORLD HEALTH ORG., DEMENTIA: A PUBLIC HEALTH PRIORITY 94 (2012),
http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/dementia_report_2012/en/. 94.
3
Id.
4
Jerold E. Rothkoff, Litigating Nursing Home Abuse and Neglect Cases, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2002, at
12, 16.
5
At least one author has estimated that so-called “elopement” cases—involving patients who abscond
either intentionally or through wandering—account for 10% of all cases involving litigation against nursing
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may occur in the confines of the person’s own home or in care facilities, with
or without the direct supervision of caregivers.6 Dementia complicates the
question of intent on the part of the person to engage in particular behaviors
or cause consequent harm. Harm-causing behaviors may also be isolated from
formation of any intention to engage in the behavior, much less to cause the
consequent harms. Attributing liability for harm caused by the wandering
behaviors of defendants with dementia is therefore a challenge for multiple
jurisdictions.
Though sure to change as the prevalence of dementia increases
alongside unprecedented population aging, the case law in this area is
undeveloped.7 Jurisprudence examining the impact of impaired reasoning on
legal liability has typically centered on criminal liability rather than civil
liability.8 In criminal law, many jurisdictions have adopted or modified the
MacNaughton9 rules, which focus on what the defendant subjectively
understood or intended. In contrast, jurisprudence governing liability for
tortious harms caused by people with impaired reasoning as a consequence of
behaviors associated with their disease is less developed or coherent,10 often
relying on objective standards—what the reasonable person, without the
impairment, would have understood, rather than what the person with the
impairment did understand—with no adjustment for impaired reasoning.11
Some jurisdictions began with a subjective standard but have since moved to
an objective one.12
Academic commentary is divided between the need to compensate
blameless victims and the injustice of holding an impaired defendant liable
homes in the United States. See Leo G. Foxwell, Elopement—Exposure and Control, J. OF LONG-TERM CARE
ADMIN., Winter 1993–94, at 9.
6
It has been estimated that the incidence of wandering by people with dementia in community
settings, for example, is as high as sixth percent. See Tony Hope et al., Wandering in dementia: a longitudinal
study, 13 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 137 (2001).
7
Reasons for the comparatively small body of law may be that many potential cases are resolved
through settlement, such as those arising from motor vehicle accidents; or that defendants may choose not to
raise their impairment as factor in mitigation of liability, for fear of stigmatization.
8
We note the extensive body of case law and scholarship on issues such as contractual and
testamentary capacity but distinguish it in this context on the basis that a finding of impaired capacity in these
contexts tends to result in invalidation of the relevant act or decision, rather than providing a defense against
liability for the consequences of that act or decision, as is the case in tort or criminal law.
9
Sometimes spelled “M’Naghten.”
10
Wendy Bonython, The Standard of Care in Negligence: The Elderly Defendant with Dementia in
Australia, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 119, 127 (2011).
11
See, e.g., Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234 (Austl.).
12
Gerhard Wagner, Comparative Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1028
(Mathias Reinmann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006).
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for the consequences of actions he or she may have no ability to control.13
Some jurisdictions (typically code jurisdictions) have granted personal
immunity from negligence suits to people with impaired capacity, and instead
impose secondary “caregiver” liability on those who are deemed to have been
negligent in exercising control over the individual with dementia. This could
be a public or private institution, community care provider, family member,
or other volunteer.
Either approach is problematic when considered against the principles
underpinning the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(“CRPD”), which entered into force in 2008.14 The Convention applies to
people with a broad range of disabilities: physical, mental, sensory, and
intellectual. Article 1 of the CRPD states the following:
The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and
ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to
promote respect for their inherent dignity.
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in
interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
It is clear, therefore, that the CRPD’s emphasis on “full and equal
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” applies to people
with cognitive impairment, including dementia. Most academic and public
commentary on the implications of compliance with the Convention has
focused on issues such as involuntary detention and treatment of people with
mental illness. That focus is now broadening to encompass other implications
for legal systems engaging with people with mental and cognitive impairment
disabilities including: the franchise, financial management, and liability.
13

For detailed reviews of the case law on mentally ill defendants in trespass and negligence in the
USA, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and Australia, see generally Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in
Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924); Pamela Picher, The Tortious Liability of the
Insane in Canada, 13 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 193 (1975); Stephanie Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in
Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983); LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON THE LIABILITY IN TORT
OF
MENTALLY
DISABLED
PERSONS
(1985)
(Ir.),
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rLiabilityMentallyDisabled.htm;
Nikki
Bromberger,
Negligence and Inherent Unreasonableness, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 411 (2010).
14
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. As of April
2016, the Convention has 162 parties.
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Article 12 of the CRPD—Equal recognition before the law—requires,
among other things, that persons with disabilities “enjoy legal capacity on an
equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”15 It also requires that States
provide people with disabilities appropriate supportive measures to exercise
that legal capacity and safeguards to prevent abuse, “proportional and tailored
to the person’s circumstances” for “the shortest time possible” and subject to
“competent, independent and impartial” oversight.16 For the purposes of
interpreting the Article, legal capacity has been defined as “the ability to hold
rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise these rights and duties (legal
agency).”17 Included within that range of legal rights and duties are likely to
be the rights and duties forming the substrate of tortious liability, at least as
far as involves relationships between people with dementia and public or state
entities, such as care providers and other state agencies. It may be argued that
the CRPD only formally affects relations between the state and the individual
rather than between private individuals. Yet many institutional care providers
and potential plaintiffs, such as transportation services, are publicly funded or
owned. Therefore, countries seeking full compliance with the Convention
must adopt a consistent approach to all litigation involving claims of harm
caused by people with dementia—regardless of the public or private nature of
the respective parties. Alternatively, they must accept a two-tier system of
determining liability, where litigation between private actors—as claimants or
caregiver defendants—is determined according to one set of rules, and
litigation involving a public actor is determined under another.
Article 12 has been widely interpreted to require that states replace
“substituted” decision-making with “supported” decision-making.
A
“supported” decision is one in which the person with the disability (including
what might traditionally be viewed as a lack of capacity) is provided
assistance to reach his or her own decisions. A “substitute” model is one in
which an appointed decision-maker makes decisions on his or her behalf.18 In
many jurisdictions, efforts to comply with Article 12 have included
widespread reform of legal mechanisms for substituted and delegated
15

Id. at art. 12.
Id.
17
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, Art. 12: Equal
Recognition before the Law, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, at ¶ 13 (2014).
18
See, e.g., Terry Carney, Supported Decision-Making for People with Cognitive Impairments: An
Australian Perspective?, 4 LAWS 37 (2015); Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable
Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013); Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal
Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult
Road From Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8 (2012).
16
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decision-making, particularly where such decision-making power is vested in
a substitute by a tribunal or other legal mechanism, rather than by the person’s
own nomination through a prior enduring power of attorney appointment.19
Understandably, most of the reform has focused on people with
impaired decision-making capacity in the context of major considered or
deliberative decisions, such as financial or legal decision-making. Few
reforms have considered the impact Article 12 should have on the personal
liability of people who are unable to foresee the consequences of their actions
due to their disability, impairing their short-term decision-making ability.
Decisions of this type—those that are affected by the person’s inability to
foresee the consequences of a decision—have the highest probability to result
in harms giving rise to a negligence claim.
Retaining personal liability is problematic from a CRPD perspective in
both common law and civil law systems. The common law model holds
people with a disability (such as dementia) to a standard those without a
disability are unlikely to encounter, that is to avoid harm beyond one’s
capacity to foresee or prevent. Such liability may also be a failure to ensure
no “arbitrary deprivation of property” under Article 12. The civil law model
is a paternalistic approach that denies dementia-affected people autonomy,
and instead subjects them to the control of others, while imposing liability for
the negligent exercise of that control on people who may not willingly—or
knowingly—assume it.
Wandering—and dementia more broadly—also raises new and
enduring questions of policy and principle for tort law. With regard to policy,
Professor Edward P. Richards frames the issue as finding a judicious path
through the poles of liability and immunity and exploring alternative forms of
compensation and prevention.20 The optimum balance, he says, will ensure
that the law protects and compensates victims without creating disincentives
to undertake caregiver roles21 or incentives for excessive restraint or
19

In Australia, see, e.g., VICTORIAN PARLIAMENT LAW REFORM COMM., INQUIRY INTO POWERS OF
ATTORNEY, (PARLIAMENTARY PAPER NO. 352) 225–27 (2010); VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N,
GUARDIANSHIP: FINAL REPORT 24 (2012); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, OLDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW 99 (2007); N.S.W. LAND AND PROP. MGMT. AUTH.,
REVIEW OF THE POWERS OF ATTORNEY ACT 2003 12 (2009).
20
Edward P. Richards, Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries Caused by Persons
with Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 GA. L. REV. 621, 622, 649 (2001). Richards is Professor of Health and Public
Policy Law at Louisiana State University Law School.
21
Id. at 622.
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surveillance of dementia sufferers,22 lest this contravene the fundamental
rights of persons with disabilities.
With regard to principle, wandering and the advent of the CRPD bring
a new lens to familiar controversies about the fundamental justifications for
tort law. If sanction for fault is considered the key justification for attributing
liability, difficult questions emerge such as the capacity of a person with
dementia to meet a reasonable standard of care23 and the moral culpability of
altruistic caregivers. If general or specific deterrence of accidents is the
fundamental concern, the question is whether the law of unintentional torts
can realistically shape the behavior of dementia-affected persons and their
beleaguered caregivers. Finally, if compensation and fair distribution of loss
are the primary goals, the question arises as to whether tort law is the best
means of achieving these goals. This is particularly the case where the victim
of an accident is reluctant to sue those with dementia or their families, or
where there are difficulties ascertaining the details of an incident where a party
to an accident suffers from dementia.24 Instead, collectivized, no-blame
models of social insurance, such as New Zealand’s accidental injury liability
scheme,25 may provide useful guides for grappling with this emerging social
issue.
This Article evaluates existing models for the treatment of wanderingrelated accidents in tort law and makes recommendations for reform in this
area. Part II describes the default common law position of imposing liability
for harm caused by persons with mental impairment. This Article examines
an underlying tension between policy goals that promote care-giving behavior
on the one hand and concern for public safety on the other, but also the
potential for how these goals can be pursued simultaneously. Part III analyzes
the concept of caregiver liability in lieu of direct liability for persons with
mental impairment. It identifies in the divergent approaches among
jurisdictions common tensions in matters of principle and policy. In Part IV,
the Article focuses on the evolving position of Japan because of its recent
appellate consideration of this issue, legal hybridity and eclecticism, and its
status as the world’s most rapidly aging society, which has made wandering a
recognized social problem. Police statistics for 2015 indicate that a record
22

Id.
Bonython, supra note 10, at 133.
24
Masuda Jun, Anzen, anshin na shakai to kōreisha jiko no hōri [Legal Principles of a Safe and Secure
Society and Accidents Involving the Elderly], 6 CHŪO LŌ JĀNARU [CHŪO L.J.] 39, 44 (2009) (Japan).
25
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 (N.Z.).
23
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12,208 people suffering from dementia were reported missing and 479 of
these were deceased when located, having met with accidents or due to
exposure or dehydration.26 One newspaper reports that 115 people with
dementia died in train accidents alone between 2004 and 2012.27 Part V
attempts a deeper comparative analysis of the nature and justifications for
caregiver liability and introduces competing models of how interventions can
be justified in the lives of persons with mental impairment in the name of
public safety. The Article concludes that, absent a publicly funded no fault
compensation scheme, the fairest option is a model that apportions joint
liability between caregivers and people with dementia based on a subjective
assessment of the parties’ circumstances. Such a model would permit
recognition of fluctuating and variable capacity on the part of the person
affected. It would also comply with human rights norms and the primacy of
the rights and interests of the person under care without imposing an
intolerable burden on altruistic or professional caregivers. The Article also
proposes some strict conditions to allow derivation of caregiver liability from
the care relationship in the name of compliance with the CRPD and
contemporary expectations.
This introduction ends with a note of caution, namely that the
jurisdictions considered in this Article differ in significant ways, including
legal tradition, culture, and the social-policy context. In Japan, Australia, and
the United Kingdom, for example, professionally provided aged and acute
care is often fully funded or subsidized by the state or compulsory insurance
premiums, and there are typically extensive state-based licensing and
accreditation requirements imposed on care providers. Findings of caregiver
liability, therefore, could potentially result in damages awards being borne by
the taxpayer, both directly and through liability claims directed at the state
regulator for failure to adequately regulate.28 Conversely, in jurisdictions such
as the United States where aged care is typically privately funded, there may
be greater appetite to hold professional caregivers liable, as damages awards
26

Record 12,000 people with dementia reported missing in Japan in 2015, JAPAN TIMES (June 16,
2016),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/16/national/social-issues/record-12000-peopledementia-reported-missing-japan-2015/#article_history.
27
Ninchishō: 115-nin tetsudō jikoshi, izoku ni baishō seikyū mo [Dementia: 115 Deaths from Railway
Accidents, Even Compensation Claims Against the Bereaved], MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Jan. 12, 2014),
http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20140112k0000m040087000c.html. In the 2014–2015 Japanese financial
year, 1165 persons with dementia had their licenses revoked under new rules introduced to ensure that drivers
do not pose a threat through illness. 7711 driver’s licenses revoked, suspended due to illness, JAPAN TIMES
(July 16, 2015).
28
Noting that the latter obstacle could be overcome by implementation of a statutory provision
granting immunity from negligence for the regulator.
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will not be funded by the taxpayer. Another significant difference is that some
jurisdictions, such as the United States, typically do not award damages for
pure economic loss,29 but this is not the case in other jurisdictions, such as
Japan and many common law jurisdictions.
Certainly, the difference between common law and civil law
jurisdictions should not be ignored, no less the apparent schism between the
civil law delict and the common law of torts. On the other hand, this overlooks
common developments within each tradition and shared roots in Roman law,
which are examined below.30 It is also possible to speculate that common law
courts (especially in the United States) are reluctant to impose liability upon
caregivers because of a stronger ethos of individualism and selfresponsibility.31 In contrast, Japanese law may be imbued with more
collectivist or communitarian values.32 Yet, even if this is true, shared
demographic and industrial changes may be forging convergence toward
collectivization of loss beyond the immediate parties and their families, that
is, through liability insurance and greater support for caregivers in the wider
community. While contextual differences must be accounted for, there is a
danger that they may be overstated to the detriment of fruitful comparative
analysis. After all, accidents occur in all jurisdictions, which may explain
why tort law continues to be a major area of comparative law and a focus of
regional harmonization efforts.33
II.

LIABILITY OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL IMPAIRMENT

This Part examines the approaches of selected common law
jurisdictions to the tortious liability of persons with mental impairment,
prefaced by a discussion of the legal status of these persons more generally.

29

See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). This is not true of all
U.S. states. See, e.g., J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979); People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985); Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 359–
61 (Alaska 1987).
30
Wagner, supra note 12, at 1007.
31
Bruce Jennings, Freedom Fading: On Dementia, Best Interests, and Public Safety, 35 GA. L. REV.
593, 596 (2001).
32
TAKAO TANASE, COMMUNITY AND THE LAW: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN
LIBERALISM AND JAPANESE MODERNITY 141 (Luke Nottage & Leon Wolff eds. And trans., 2010).
33
Wagner, supra note 12, at 1007.
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Legal Status of People with Mental or Cognitive Impairment

Common law responses to people with mental impairment have been
somewhat incoherent. While it is well established that people who commit
crimes while “lacking reason” should not be punished for those crimes, it was
not until the sensational trials of Hadfield34 and MacNaughten35 in the
Victorian era that the formal framework of the insanity plea, coupled with
provisions for “protective” imprisonment, emerged.36
Although the
MacNaughten defense, as it came to be known, has since undergone
significant reform in many common law jurisdictions, the crux of the defense
still rests on the basis that it is wrong to punish someone for criminal conduct
when their mental impairment prevented them from knowing that such
conduct was wrong, or prevented them from resisting that conduct.
Rather than being predicated on a formal diagnosis, access to the
insanity-type defenses in criminal matters rests on questions of subjective
functional capacity: what did the accused understand or intend? If the
accused has a diagnosed mental illness or impairment, for example, but the
impairment did not affect the accused’s ability to understand the nature or
criminality of his or her act at the time of commission, the defense will not be
available. Conversely, in the absence of a specific diagnosis, but with clear
evidence of an impairment affecting the accused’s ability to understand the
nature of the act, an accused will be able to access the defense. This emphasis
on functionality over formality is also reflected in the common law response
to many other aspects of self-determination and legal personhood, such as
testamentary capacity and the appointment of guardians.
The starting point for this common law response is the 1869 decision
of Banks v. Goodfellow, which established the common law test for
testamentary capacity:

34

See Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial of Treason for James
Hadfield (1800), 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 487, 488–89.
35
See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, “Literature as Law”: The History of the Insanity Plea and a
Fictional Application within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 381, 390–93 (1999).
36
Significantly, a successful pleading of the insanity defense generally results in the defendant being
acquitted of the offence; however, unless the defendant can demonstrate successfully that they no longer pose
a risk of further offending, they are likely to be referred to a forensic tribunal which, in many jurisdictions,
has the power to impose a period of hospitalization or psychiatric treatment, potentially of longer duration
than the maximum sentence for the offense.
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[A] testator [a] shall understand the nature of the act and its
effects; [b] shall understand the extent of the property of which
he is disposing; [c] shall be able to comprehend and appreciate
the claims to which he ought to give effect; and with a view to
the latter object, [d] that no disorder of the mind shall poison his
affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of
his natural faculties—that no insane delusion shall influence his
will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it
which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.37
This test has been modified in various contexts related to guardianship
and decision-making law more broadly through legislative and common law
reform. The United Kingdom’s Mental Capacity Act 2005, for example,
defines someone as “unable to make a decision for himself” (lacking capacity)
as a person with an inability “(a) to understand the information relevant to the
decision, (b) to retain that information, (c) to use or weigh that information as
part of the process of making the decision, or (d) to communicate his decision
(whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).”38 The section
also formally recognizes that a requirement for simplified explanations of
relevant information and that an ability to retain the relevant information for
only a short period does not prevent someone from being regarded as “able to
make a decisions,” thereby specifically addressing circumstances commonly
encountered by people with dementia.39 The common law has also embraced
a rebuttable presumption of capacity in adults,40 which is commonly reflected
in legislation.41
This functional, transaction-specific approach is a departure from the
historical approach.
In the past, declarations of incapacity were
comprehensive: a person lacking the capacity to make a decision was
presumed to lack capacity to make any decision. In more recent periods, the
powers of appointed or substituted decision-makers have been less absolute,
typically covering specific classes of decisions, such as financial, health, or

37

Banks v. Goodfellow [1870] L.R. 5 Q.B. 549 (Ir.).
Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, § 3 (Eng.).
39
Id. Similar principles have also been adopted in other jurisdictions through the common law. See,
e.g., Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 (Austl.).
40
See, e.g., Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 (Austl.); In Re
MB [1997] 2 FCR 514 (Eng.).
41
See, e.g., Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld.) (Austl.).
38
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welfare-related decisions.42 Furthermore, appointed decision-makers are
increasingly bound by requirements to consider the wishes of the person upon
whose behalf they are acting.
Guardianship law continues to evolve in tandem with international
human rights norms. The CRPD mandates the development of more nuanced
models of “supported” decision-making, in preference to fully substituted
decision-making, to ensure that people with impaired capacity retain their
legal decision-making powers to the maximum extent possible. This is
particularly significant in dealing with people with dementia, who frequently
experience fluctuating capacity. That is, depending on the nature of their
condition, they may have a greater ability to understand the consequences of
particular legal decisions at some times than at others.
Precisely how the CRPD should be complied with is contested by
States, with many States adopting different interpretations of the CRPD from
those espoused by the CRPD Committee. Article 12 could be superficially
interpreted as rendering all tests for legal capacity largely moot, as such tests
have operated as the threshold for decision substitution rather than support. A
more nuanced view recognizes that such a position would effectively deny
people the right and autonomy to have their wishes respected where these are
expressed prior to the occurrence of serious illness or disease through an
advanced care directive or enduring power of attorney, typically conditional
on loss of decision-making capacity. Furthermore, for people who are at the
most extreme end of the spectrum of illness and impairment—for example,
those who are persistently unconscious—strict applications of Article 12
provide little scope for recognition of their rights under a supportive
framework. The practical implications of caring for people who legitimately
cannot exercise legal capacity on their own behalf, therefore, means that tests
for legal capacity of the type described above are likely to retain relevance for
the foreseeable future, even if this capacity is presumed.
The retention of tests for capacity also allows for a certain degree of
subjectivity, tailored to the specific circumstances of the person involved.
Unfortunately, as described in the next section, principles defining tortious
liability of people with intellectual or mental impairment have not developed
in a similar manner. Instead, the common law has adopted a rigid approach
42

See, e.g., Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, § 16 (Eng.); Guardianship and Management of Property
Act 1991 (ACT) ss 7–8 (Austl.).
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to the liability of people with mental impairment for harms committed in tort,
disregarding their personal circumstances.
B.

Tortious Liability of Dementia Sufferers

Courts in common law jurisdictions generally hold that ongoing mental
impairment does not justify any deviation from the objective “reasonable
person” standard used to measure any other defendant’s conduct.43 The
standard is therefore neither individual-subjective (reasonableness given the
actual circumstances of the person) nor class-subjective (reasonableness
adjusted to the type of impairment). This contrasts markedly with the criminal
law tests of insanity and well-established jurisprudence permitting adjustment
to the “reasonable person” standard of care in the case of physical illness or
disability, at least those of sudden onset.44
There are a number of arguments in policy and principle for applying
an objective standard to defendants with a mental impairment. First, in a
criminal context, the test is linked to concepts of mens rea and guilt that have
no exact equivalents in civil cases, which apply a different standard of proof
and usually have less severe consequences for the liberty of the defendant.
Second, a subjective test suffers from a deficit of “administrability.” A finder
of fact, especially a jury, may find it difficult to determine what constitutes a
reasonable standard of behavior for a person with a particular mental disability
or illness. A third doctrinal reason adopted in the Australian case of Carrier
v. Bonham is that mental impairment, unlike a given stage of childhood, is too
idiosyncratic a condition to warrant a class-subjective standard.45 A fourth
justification, also from Carrier, is that where mental impairment has deprived
a person of capacity (here, taken as reason itself), it precludes any prospect of
reasonableness, whether assessed subjectively or objectively. 46 A fifth reason
is that a departure from a common standard would merely entrench the
marginalization of persons who deviate from mainstream society in their
degree of mental capacity.47

43

See, e.g.,Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Eng.); Adamson v. Motor Vehicle Ins.
Trust (1957) 58 WALR 56 (Eng.); Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234 (Austl.).
44
See, e.g., Leahy v Beaumont (1981) 27 SASR 290 (Austl.); Roberts v. Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR
823 (Eng.); Waugh v. James K. Allan Ltd. [1964] S.C. (H.L.) 102 (Eng.); Scholz v Standish [1961] SASR
123 (Austl.); Mansfield v. Weetabix, [1997] 1 WLR 1263 (Eng.).
45
Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234 at ¶ 37 (Austl.).
46
Id. at ¶ 8.
47
Id. at ¶ 37.
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More nuanced approaches are available. There is a growing
understanding of the diverse types and causes of mental impairment, its
prevalence, and how to achieve more reliable diagnoses. As such, greater
predictability of the progression of particular conditions such as dementia is
increasingly possible, thereby removing it from the scope of “personal
idiosyncrasy.” With this knowledge, it should be theoretically possible to
group individuals within classes, which are susceptible to class-subjective
standards of reasonableness, or to regard mental impairment as comparable to
other (i.e. physical) impairments,48 which are accorded a greater degree of
flexibility. Accordingly, factors such as the ability of tortfeasors and potential
victims to control for the particular impairment would have a bearing on the
question of what is reasonable in the circumstances.49
In practice in the case of dementia, however, which is attributable at
least in part to physical causes such as organic deterioration of the brain,
proposals for recognizing a class-subjective standard have encountered
resistance on at least two fronts. First, the progressive, fluctuating nature of
dementia complicates the question of what standard of reasonableness should
be applied. Second, sufferers impaired by dementia, especially those with
Alzheimer’s disease, may be unaware of their impairment itself, which makes
it difficult to determine what constitutes a reasonable precaution against harm
in the circumstances.
Countervailing arguments supporting recognition of a class-subjective
standard include the following. First, the disparate stages of dementia are well
documented and could provide a baseline for class-subjective standards.
Second, some harms may be causally related to a specific physiological
manifestation of dementia that may enliven a sudden incapacitation defense,
that is constituting a factor that no reasonable person in the circumstances
could have prevented. For example, one U.S. court has accepted expert
medical evidence that the cause of a car accident may have been a “sensory
overload caused by Alzheimer’s disease.”50 Finally, the remaining capacity
of dementia sufferers to make decisions (and thus to adopt a reasonable
standard of care) should be respected in light of the development of
international human rights norms relating to mental disability discussed
above.
48
49
50

Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029. See also Bromberger, supra note 13, at 435.
Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029.
Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 145–46 (N.C. 1999).
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A related question is whether to impose any liability at all upon those
with significant mental impairments. This raises questions of justice,
principle, and policy. In the common law, courts have sometimes invoked the
principle that “where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should
be borne by the one who occasioned it.”51 Furthermore, courts have invoked
policy reasons for imposing liability: first, preventing false claims of
incapacity; and second, creating an incentive for family members with a future
stake in the estate of the person liable to “restrain and control” persons who
may be dangerous for reasons of mental impairment.52 In contrast, in a line
of cases in the United States, the courts have created an exception from
liability for persons with mental impairment for harm caused to professional
caregivers in institutions.53 The policy rationale regarding incentives of
family members is not considered applicable because the family has already
done everything reasonable to restrain the potentially dangerous person by
admitting them to care.54
Assistant Professor Sarah E. Light is unconvinced, deriding the
American Law Institute’s view that “if mental defectives are to live in the
world they should pay for the damage they do.”55 Light sees in this view a
fearful, segregationist view of mental disabilities reflecting a long legacy of
discrimination, prejudice, xenophobia, and coercion.56 Light argues that the
doctrine developed by the courts unnecessarily “articulates a norm of
confinement.”57
For example, the “one of two innocents” principle creates incentives
for confinement of family members with dementia58 despite being “inherently
unjust,” “nothing more than a statement of strict liability,” and failing to
consider alternative forms of compensation.59 For the same reason, Light is
critical of the policy rationale that family members with a stake in inheritance
should have an incentive to restrain and control.60 Light sees in this a mere
51

Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970).
Id.
53
See Sarah Light, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the Mentally Disabled
Under Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381, 400 (1999). Light is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business
Ethics at The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania.
54
See, e.g., Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996).
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
56
Light, supra note 53, at 389–90.
57
Id. at 381.
58
Id. at 386.
59
Id. at 387.
60
Id. at 389.
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reinforcement of the norm of confinement toward institutionalization.61 At
the same time, she questions whether this norm is capable of bringing about
the precise behavior modification anticipated by the courts.62 This is because
of poor public awareness of this obscure legal doctrine, mistaken assumptions
about the capacity for family control, and misapprehensions about both the
amounts of inheritable wealth at stake and the relative importance of this in
shaping family members’ motives.63 More insidiously, it entrenches a de
facto double standard, where the standard of care exercised by family
members in caring is presumably higher where there is potential for the family
member to inherit, and lower if the affected relative is impecunious. The
negative and discriminatory message sent by the courts through articulating
this norm of confinement therefore outweighs any possible benefit to public
safety.
III.

CAREGIVER LIABILITY

If the person with mental impairment is indeed an unsuitable defendant
for legal, moral, or economic reasons, a plaintiff may look to a caregiver as
an alternative or joint defendant. The nature of this liability is far from settled.
In Roman law, the head of a family owed strict liability for the acts of family
members.64 In other cultures with patrilineal families, such as Japan, similar
rules applied, though it is debatable whether the origins were indigenous or
traceable to imported codes.65 Neither strict liability nor vicarious liability are
precisely applicable for caregiver liability where harm is caused to a third
party by a person with mental impairment. Strict liability on the part of a
principal, for example, typically requires the agent to demonstrate fault.66
Furthermore, vicarious liability is usually wedded to the concept of enterprise
liability.67 Additionally, it is not clear what is meant by a “caregiver” in the
concept of caregiver liability. Typically, this term is used to define someone
who provides some form of material assistance to another. “Caregiver
liability” could equally refer to the less proximate role of watching out for
another, in which case “supervisory liability” may be a more appropriate term.
For the purposes of this Article, the term “caregiver liability” is used to avoid
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 400.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392–93.
Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 1, 2016, 2014 (Ju) 1434, 70 (3) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [MINSHŪ] 681

(Japan).
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begging the question of what the role entails and how it might generate
liability to third parties.
Caregiver liability is fraught with the same problems identified by Light
above, particularly with the potential expression of a norm of confinement.
Indeed, it may conflict with another line of case law that imposes tortious
liability on professional caregivers (though not necessarily family caregivers)
for unwarranted deprivation of liberty.68 It is also questionable whether
caregiver liability is consistent with the common law tradition’s reluctance to
impose on defendants a positive duty for omissions or otherwise to take action
to prevent harms not of their own making. As explored in greater detail below,
this problem may be overcome by positive statutory duties.69 Nevertheless,
there are some possible foundations for caregiver liability in the common law.
A.

The United States

While the basic position in the United States is one of personal liability
on the part of persons with mental impairment, there is a line of cases
considering caregiver liability. These cases fall within a broader, developing
area of negligence law in which a range of defendants, including vendors of
weapons,70 spouses of sexual predators,71 schools,72 parents,73 police
conducting surveillance,74 and employment referees,75 have been argued to be
liable for the harmful actions of a third party.
Due to a range of policy concerns including insurance costs and the
realities of care, courts in the United States have, in imposing liability upon
caregivers, tended to distinguish between professional caregivers and
informal caregivers.76 There are a number of cases relating to care institutions
where a person was released from institutional care and then proceeded to
cause harm to a third party.77 In these cases, the courts have required specific
68

See P v. Cheshire West [2014] UKSC 19 (Eng.).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
70
Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999); Buczkowski v. McKay, 490 N.W.2d 330
(Mich. 1992); Gallara v. Koskovich, 836 A.2d 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
71
J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).
72
District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30 (D.C. 1987).
73
Moore v. Crumpton, 285 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
74
Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1982).
75
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
76
Edward P. Richards, Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries Caused by Persons
with Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 GA. L. REV. 621, 648 (2001).
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Id. at 649.
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evidence that the person posed a threat before liability is imposed.78 Courts
have also been reluctant to allow a concern with protecting third parties to
interfere with the rehabilitative goals informing administrative decisions to
reintegrate inmates of institutions into the community.79 There are also cases
that consider the duty of care an institution owes third parties harmed by a
person currently in its care. These typically involve the question of whether
injuries inflicted on another patient or resident were foreseeable.80 However,
in Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, the Florida District Court of
Appeals found an institution liable for failing to prevent a person with
dementia from causing harm to an external third party by driving a car.81 This
was based on general principles underlying the articulation of the “duty to
control conduct of third persons” in section 315 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts,82 as interpreted by the Court:
[T]here is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless: (a) a
special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s
conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.83
Consistent with the subsequent re-articulation of this principle in
section 41 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,84 the Court held that the
assumption of control by the institution over the patient constituted a special
relation with the patient and found the institution liable.85 The control in this
case was assumed through the presence of locked gates designed to prevent
wandering, but also strategies that had attempted to prevent the person with
dementia from driving, whether these were strictly authorized by law or not.86
The corollary is that where there was no such assumption of control, there
would be no liability. Professor Richards supports this view, arguing that
from a public policy perspective the duty to the public and the duty to the
78

Id.
Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234–35 (Ariz. 1977); Sherrill v. Wilson,
653 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Mo. 1983).
80
Vaughn E. James, No Help for the Helpless: How the Law has Failed to Serve and Protect Persons
Suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 407, 434–35 (2012).
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Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 55, at § 315.
83
Garrison Retirement Home, 484 So.2d at 1261.
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 69, at § 41.
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Id. at 1262.
79

April 2018

Whose Fault in an Aging World?

425

patient are “mutually reinforcing” and should indeed be merged, a notion this
Article returns to below.87
Despite the public policy context reinforcing a distinction between
professional and family care in the United States, the logic behind the
rationale for imposing liability upon persons with mental impairments is
equally applicable to informal caregivers. That is, a concern over personal
liability and future inheritance creates an incentive for family members to
restrain and control a potentially dangerous individual.88 However, as
Richards observes, United States courts have been reluctant in a family
context to endorse this “norm of confinement” as formulated by Light.89 In
Emery v. Littlejohn, the Washington Supreme Court found the defendants not
liable after the plaintiff was shot by the defendant’s adult son while he was
under the defendant’s care, having been released from a mental institution.90
The Court allowed room for a general duty to the public on the part of a
“private person having the legal custody and control of a violently insane
person with homicidal tendencies” grounding liability for “want of care and
restraint” where there is clear evidence that dangerous behavior was
foreseeable.91 However, the Court was reluctant to articulate even this very
high threshold due to the lack of an exact precedent.92
The possibility of informal caregiver liability was present in the (nowsuperseded) Restatement (Second) of Torts section 319 (1965) relating to
persons with “dangerous propensities”:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or
should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control
the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.93
Despite this, United States case law has affirmed the very high
threshold in Emery for liability that arises from the care and control of family
members with a mental impairment. To begin with, a duty has been held to

87
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Richards, supra note 76, at 652.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Emery v. Littlejohn, 145 P. 423, 428 (Wash. 1915).
Id. at 350.
Id.
AM. LAW INST., supra note 55, at § 319–20.
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arise only where control over the person is assumed voluntarily. 94 To flesh
out what “voluntary” assumption of control might mean in such cases,
Richards uses examples from cases that consider whether defendants have
voluntarily taken responsibility for a child’s care.95 These cases in turn
consider the liability of volunteers in employment contexts: the undertaking
to brace a wall, say, even where to do so was not itself a duty, brings with it
liability to use “reasonable skill and care” in the performance of the work.96
A comparable duty also attaches to an undertaking to control and supervise a
child beyond a mere invitation to a “social guest.”97 The assumption of the
duty must also be specific: for example, simply providing one’s home to be
used as a residence in a general sense may be insufficient to constitute
assumption of the duty.98 Furthermore, liability will only proceed from an
actual ability to control.99 The threshold of liability is then determined largely
by whether the caregiver had notice with regard to the threat, which was
therefore foreseeable.100
For example, in Alva v. Cook, the California Court of Appeals found
two sisters not liable when their mentally ill adult brother shot and killed the
plaintiff, stating that:
In the absence of ultimate facts that [the brother] was dangerous
to himself and others at least sufficient to warrant a reasonable
assumption that a petition for evaluation or commitment . . .
would be granted, we are not ready to equate respondents’
assumption of a moral obligation to a guarantee and
indemnification agreement in respect of [the brother’s] conduct
on or off respondents’ premises as if he were a dog and to hold
that respondents are their brother’s keeper but at their risk.101
Professor Richards also argues that this high threshold creates no
incentive for informal caregivers to voluntarily assume control where there is
foreseeable harm, and therefore the greatest risk to the public.102 Richards
94

Richards, supra note 76, at 655.
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Carmona v. Padilla, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742–43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
100
Richards, supra note 76, at 655. See also Bollinger v. Rader, 69 S.E. 497 (N.C. 1910); Fisher v.
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concludes that the right balance of incentives will only exist if caregiver
immunity from liability is premised on reasonable measures to protect the
public.103 This also appears to rest on foreseeability, but the onus shifts to the
defendant and the threshold for liability would be lower than Emery. Richards
cites Irons v. Cole,104 in which a caregiver was found liable for harm to a third
party when a mentally impaired adult family member accessed a gun on the
caregiver’s premises. For Richards, the logic of the case should be extended
to more commonplace situations, such as where the implement of harm is a
vehicle rather than a weapon (readily conceivable in an aging society).105 The
argument is that a caregiver, no matter his or her altruistic motives, only
deserves immunity if it can be established that he or she in no way contributed
to the harmful act occurring. This logic is evident in section 37 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: while reaffirming the basic principle that a
plaintiff does not have an affirmative duty to prevent harms from a risk not of
his or her creation, section 37 clarifies that this is “conditioned on the actor
having played no role in facilitating the third party’s conduct, such as by
providing a dangerous weapon to an insane individual.”106
B.

The United Kingdom and Australia

While caregiver liability has not been explored in non-United States
common law jurisdictions to the same extent, the case law in other
jurisdictions contains clues as to how to overcome the doctrinal obstacles to
such liability. The allusion in Alva v. Cook above to “my brother’s keeper”
refers (through the biblical usage) to a line of cases in the common law,
culminating in United Kingdom House of Lords decisions in Home Office v.
Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.107 and Smith v. Littlewoods Organization Ltd.,108 where
a special or proximate relationship, such as control of prisoners or minors, was
required before a defendant would, by omission, be liable for the wrongdoing
of others. In Smith, Lord Justice Goff held that there is also a general liability
where “the defender negligently causes or permits to be created a source of
danger, and it is reasonably foreseeable that third parties may interfere with it
and, sparking off the danger, thereby cause damage to persons in the position
of the pursuer.”109
103
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The question, therefore, becomes one of whether a care relationship
involving dementia falls within one of these special or general exceptions. R
v. Stone and R v. Dobinson explored the notion that a defendant may have
“assumed” responsibility for the provision of care to the person, which can be
contrasted with a mere omission.110 In that case, the Court found two
defendants guilty of criminal neglect after failing to provide the “necessaries
of life” to a family member over whom they had assumed care. This was a
criminal case and the person under care was the victim rather than the agent
of harm. Yet this line of jurisprudence provides an analogous basis for
tortious liability for the acts of people with dementia to be directed back
towards a care provider who has failed to acquit a positive, assumed duty of
care.111
With regard to the second difference, namely a victim who is a third
party, a person who has assumed care could still be culpable on the following
basis. Under apportionment of liability principles operating in many common
law jurisdictions, if a person with dementia causes harm to another and they
are sued, they (or more likely, their legal guardian) could seek to join care
providers as defendants to the litigation. In this case, damages typically would
be apportioned according to comparative culpability of the person and the
caregiver. In the case of harm resulting from the negligence of a person with
dementia, the chain of causation linking the negligence of a caregiver in
failing to provide adequate care, including taking steps to prevent wandering,
for example, would potentially encompass personal liability to third parties.
However, the court must be satisfied that the actions of the person with
dementia did not constitute novus actus interveniens, i.e. a new intervening
act which breaks the chain of causation, and hence disrupts the flow of
liability.
There is, therefore, some room in these jurisdictions to develop
principles of caregiver liability beyond the high threshold of United States
law. Nevertheless, we can summarize that the basic approach in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia remains one of imposing liability
for accidents upon the immediate actor regardless of mental impairment.
Immediate actors are allocated liability largely based on public policy, rather
than principle, although these reasons can overlap. Such an assignment of
110

R v. Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 (Eng.).
Note that the legal elements of criminal negligence are broadly similar to those of civil negligence,
namely, existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, tested against the standard of the reasonable
person’s conduct in the position of the caregiver; and harm caused as a consequence of that breach of duty.
111

April 2018

Whose Fault in an Aging World?

429

liability regardless of mental impairment is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, imposing liability upon persons who may not be able to meet
the common “reasonable person” standard is unjust and logically flawed.
Second, the policy concerns underpinning many of the judgments adopting
this approach convey a “norm of confinement” inconsistent with modern
human rights norms. Third, the goal of protecting the public is also neglected
because the narrow exceptions to caregiver immunity that do exist are easily
avoided by caregivers, especially in those cases where the caregiver is best
placed to foresee and prevent the harm. Observers of this system do, however,
see potential for improvements given two conditions: first, if caregiving
behavior and concern for public safety are conceived of as mutually
reinforcing; and second, if greater responsibility is placed on caregivers to
justify their immunity from liability by being more mindful to ways in which
the environment they create can contribute to accidents occurring.
C.

Caregiver Liability in Civil Law Jurisdictions

Unlike the common law, civil law jurisdictions tend to premise
responsibility for torts on mental capacity. The origin for many jurisdictions
is section 827 of the German BGB: “A person who, in a state of
unconsciousness or in a state of pathological mental disturbance precluding
free exercise of will, inflicts damage on another person is not responsible for
such damage” unless the person “has temporarily induced such a state . . . .”112
Liability may arise nonetheless under section 829, at least as far as equity
between the parties allows, unless liability can be borne under section 832 by
a person with a legal “duty to supervise.”113 Section 832 contains an
112
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exemption from liability if the supervisor “fulfils the requirements of his duty
to supervise or if the damage would likewise have been caused in the case of
proper conduct of supervision.” The policy behind these provisions is one of
caregiver liability in principle, with some flexibility to safeguard equity for
each of the parties.
Japan adopted and adapted the provisions of the German BGB in the
late nineteenth century. The key provision is section 713 of the Civil Code,
which states:
A person who has inflicted damages on others while he/she lacks
the capacity to appreciate his/her liability for his/her own act due
to mental disability shall not be liable to compensate for the
same; provided, however, that this shall not apply if he/she has
temporarily invited that condition, intentionally or negligently.114
Like Germany’s BGB, Japan’s section 714(1) imposes liability for
third-party harm upon a person with a “legal obligation to supervise” a person
without mental capacity. The Japanese sections depart from their German
origins in two respects. First, a person without mental capacity is immune
from both responsibility and liability. Second, the scope of caregiver liability
is apparently broader: section 714(2) also imposes liability upon a person who
has assumed supervision on behalf of a person who has the legal obligation to
supervise.115
Before 2000, case law on the Japanese provisions was relatively settled.
A “person with the legal obligation to supervise” included a person with
parental authority, an adult guardian, or a spouse.116 Judicial interpretation of
the term had been informed by the pre-1999 Mental Health Act, which
requirements of his duty to supervise or if the damage would likewise have been caused in the case of proper
conduct of supervision.”).
114
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 713, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]),
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115
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if the person who has the obligation to supervise did not fail to perform his/her obligation or if the damages
could not have been avoided even if he/she had not failed to perform his/her obligation.”); id. at para. 2 (“A
person who supervises a person without capacity to assume liability, on behalf of a person who has the
obligation to supervise, shall also assume the liability under the preceding paragraph.”).
116
See Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 24, 2014, Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, KAKYŪ
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imposed certain obligations upon guardians and spouses117 toward persons
with a mental disability, for example to ensure that appropriate treatment was
sought.118 A spouse’s obligation to supervise was also drawn from elsewhere
in the Civil Code: “a husband and wife shall live together and provide mutual
cooperation and assistance.”119 This provision120 implied for cohabiting
spouses a mutual duty of “personal supervision,” including a duty to take
action when the other spouse loses independence through physical or mental
disability,121 and thus, a duty to supervise. Doctrine also developed with
regard to other issues. For example, liability for third-party harm could arise
even in the absence of a professional diagnosis of mental impairment where
there was a clear and present danger, the person was clearly experiencing a
significantly abnormal condition, and in the past had experienced bouts of a
similar nature.122
Over the past decade, the trajectory of this doctrinal development and
the fundamental principles underpinning supervisor liability faced challenges
from the advent of the CRPD and reformed guardianship laws, greater
prevalence of dementia, continued urbanization and fragmentation of
communities, and evolving social values around care responsibilities. An
opportunity to revisit these principles arose in a recent landmark case
exploring supervisor liability for a train accident. The following Part
examines this case in detail.
IV.

THE NAGOYA TRAIN ACCIDENT CASE

In December 2007, a ninety-one-year-old man who suffered advanced
dementia left his residence in Aichi Prefecture unnoticed by his daughter-in117

Seishin hoken oyobi seishin shōgaisha fukushi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Mental Health and
Welfare for the Mentally Disabled], Law No. 123 of 1950, art. 20, amended by Law No. 615 of 2016. As
discussed below, while this provision was deleted in 2011 to recognize the untenable nature of this duty in
an ageing society, it was current law at the time of the incident in this case. See Memorandum, Hogosha
seido, nyūin seido ni kansuru sagyō chīmu [Work Team on the Caregiver and Hospital Admission Systems],
Kōsei Rōdōshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], Hogosha seido no minaoshi ni tsuite (kakuron
goto no kentō) [On the Reforms to the Caregiver System (Discussion of Each Argument)] (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/2r985200000101rg-att/2r985200000101z5.pdf.
118
See Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled, art. 22, para. 1 (imposing a duty
to protect property interests and ensure medical treatment is given with regard to a person with mental
disability), amended by Law No. 615 of 2016; id. para. 2 (requiring cooperation with doctors to ensure
appropriate examination and diagnosis), amended by Law No. 615 of 2016.
119
MINPŌ art. 752, translated in (JLT DS), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
120
As well as notions of “good faith” and “common reason” (jōri) as applied to the marriage
relationship.
121
See Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB at 20–21.
122
Memorandum, Work Team on the Caregiver and Hospital Admission Systems, supra note 117, at 5.

432

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

law, who was engaged in housework, and his wife, who had momentarily
dozed off. An hour later, having managed to board a train at a nearby station,
he entered the grounds of another railway station and made his way through
an unlocked gate to the tracks, where he collided with a passing train and was
killed. In 2013, a single judge of the Nagoya District Court held that the man’s
eighty-five-year-old wife and his adult son were liable for economic harm
(¥7.1 million) caused to the railway, mainly the costs associated with
arranging alternate routes with different train companies for affected
passengers.123 In 2014, a three-member panel of the Nagoya High Court
upheld the earlier ruling, albeit only with regard to the appellant wife’s
liability, which was reduced by fifty percent due to contributory negligence
on the part of the respondent rail company.124 In 2016, the five-member 3rd
Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of Japan overruled these judgments,
finding neither the wife nor son liable.125 The following section outlines the
reasoning adopted in the first and final appeal decisions.
A.

High Court Decision

To begin with, the Nagoya High Court found that the fatal collision was
not specifically foreseeable, which precluded a finding of personal liability
for either the wife or son under section 709. Wandering itself was foreseeable
due to past behavior: the man had gone missing on two occasions in the two
years prior and had once required assistance from the police to return home.
At other times, he expressed a desire to go to work, despite having retired
many years earlier. The accident itself was nonetheless not specifically
foreseeable because the man had never attempted to board a train, enter a
dangerous area such as train tracks, or even enter somebody else’s property
without permission during a wandering incident.
Second, the Court explored the possibility of “supervisor liability”
under section 714, which is capable of broader application by the courts due
to the apparent absence of the criterion of foreseeability. This is because,
according to the Court, this form of liability is not conceived upon direct fault
for the harm, but is instead something akin to vicarious liability. The “fault”
in supervisor liability is instead that of being remiss in performing the duty of
123
Nagoya Chihō Saibansho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Aug. 9, 2013, Hei 22 (wa ワ) no. 819, 2202 HANREI
[HANJI] 68, available at WESTLAW 2013WLJPCA08096001.
124
Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB at 1.
125
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 1, 2016, Hei 26 (ju) no. 1434, 70 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 681, translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court: 2014 (Ju) 1434, SUP. CT. JAPAN,
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1448 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).

JIHŌ

April 2018

Whose Fault in an Aging World?

433

supervision. Moreover, being remiss is presumed by virtue of harm having
occurred; the burden of proof to displace the presumption therefore lies with
the supervisor.126 At the same time, the Court noted countervailing policy
factors underpinning the Civil Code, including fair allocation of loss and
liability in tort that is, in principle, fault-based. These factors appear to have
influenced the Court to nevertheless apply the criterion of foreseeability, at
least to the question of whether the presumption of failed supervision could
be rebutted in this case.
As a preliminary issue, the High Court affirmed a spouse’s legal duty
to supervise and rejected that the wife was excused through her own care
needs (she received an official assessment of need for low-level care in early
2006 for physical disabilities). The Court held that supervision is qualitatively
different than actual care and, according to the Court, she was capable of
undertaking the role of supervisor of her husband’s care due to the support
afforded her. This included the assistance of the couple’s daughter-in-law,
who had been the primary daytime caregiver since 2006. It also included
intermittent professional in-home care and institutional day care six days a
week funded by national nursing-care insurance. In contrast, the Court found
that the couple’s adult son had no legal duty to supervise. This was because,
unlike a spouse, the duty in the Civil Code to support a “lineal relative by
blood”127 was of an economic nature only. Further, the son commuted from
another city and did not live close enough to assume supervision on behalf of
his mother.
The central issue was, therefore, whether the wife could, as required by
section 714, rebut the presumption of liability by demonstrating either that she
was not remiss in fulfilling her supervisory duty or that the harm was
unavoidable. The Court held that the wife was remiss in her duty and was
thus liable. This was because there was sufficient unpredictability in the
man’s behavior to create a general, foreseeable, and preventable risk that he
would depart from his established patterns of behavior and meet with or cause
harm as a result of wandering. Furthermore, while the family had installed a
sensor at the front door to monitor the man’s movements, the man left by a
different door on the day of the accident. This door could have been
monitored readily (according to the Court) by replacing the battery in another
126

This presumption can only be overturned if the supervisor can establish that he or she was not remiss
in performing the caregiver’s duty or that the harm would have occurred in any case. See MINPŌ art. 714,
para. 1.
127
Id. art. 877, para. 1. The provision also includes a duty to siblings.
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sensor that had once been used as a shopfront bell and had been disconnected
as a disturbance.
Precisely because of the strict aspect of caregiver liability in Japan,
there was no legal mechanism in the Civil Code for claiming contributory
liability.128 Nevertheless, the Court fashioned a remedy that divided the loss
equally between the rail company and the wife. It invoked the spirit of fair
distribution of loss that the Court saw as underpinning tort law. This spirit is
manifested in provisions of the Civil Code that were not directly applicable,
specifically section 722(2), which provides for reduced liability for
contributory negligence in standard (i.e. foreseeable) negligence cases.
Furthermore, the Court engaged in a contextual assessment of fairness. This
included weighing the wife’s reasonable economic situation,129 her substantial
(though ultimately inadequate) attempt to acquit her duty of supervision, the
railway’s significant wealth,130 and the corporate responsibility of the railway
to aspire beyond legal minimums to standards that promote the safety of
vulnerable members of society such as children and those with dementia.
B.

Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court delivered a joint judgment (Justices Kiuchi,
Yamazaki, Ohashi) with an addendum (written by Justice Kiuchi), and
separate judgments written by Justice Otani and presiding Justice Okabe.
There was consensus that neither the wife nor the adult son was liable.
However, there was disagreement over the question of the existence of a duty
to supervise, which means the principles of caregiver liability remain
unresolved in certain respects.
The joint judgment held that a spouse has no legal duty to supervise,
mainly because this duty cannot be founded in a spouse’s duty to provide
mutual support, which is not directed at third parties. Justice Kiuchi held that
the legal framework attributing a legal duty to supervise to a spouse (or for
that matter an adult guardian) has changed, which justifies a departure from
precedent on this point. Prior to reforms in 1999, a person automatically
became a guardian upon a declaration of “mental incompetence” over his or
128
The existence of a fence, albeit unlocked, did constitute sufficient measures for the rail company to
satisfy its duty of safety, thus preventing any counterclaim. See Hei 26 (ju) no. 1434, 70 MINSHŪ.
129
This included several properties and ¥50 million in savings belonging to her deceased husband. See
Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB at 41.
130
JR East is Japan’s leading rail company with capital stock of over ¥100 billion at the time. Id. at 42.
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her spouse.131 As guardian, the spouse had a duty to ensure appropriate
treatment and was the primary person responsible under the Mental Health
Act to undertake the duties of a “protector” (hogosha), including supervision
to prevent harm to self and others.132 Since several anti-paternalistic
amendments to the Mental Health Act in 1999, a “protector” must still ensure
that a person with a mental illness or disability receives treatment, but there is
no longer an obligation to prevent harm to self or others. Furthermore, a
spouse is no longer automatically appointed guardian. Indeed, alongside the
new guardianship regime and demographic changes, the percentage of nonfamily members such as legal professionals appointed guardian has increased
from 16% in 2003 to approximately 66% in 2014.133
The judgment had implications for adult guardians as well as spouses.
An adult guardian, according to Justice Kiuchi, bears merely an aspirational
duty to ensure appropriate medical treatment and nursing care. Although the
guardianship reforms in 2000 created new duties to consider the views,
lifestyle, and physical or mental situation of the protected person,134 these are
guidelines for making decisions rather than a requirement to supervise. In
contrast, supervision—including that aimed at preventing harm to third
parties—is an activity of a non-legal nature that falls beyond the scope of a
guardian’s duties and authority. Justice Otani disagreed on this point. How,
he asked, can a person assume a legal duty on behalf of another if there is no
party (i.e. a guardian) that can be designated by law to bear that duty? Justice
Otani conceded that the actual labor of supervision has, since the 1999
reforms, been expressly excluded from the scope of adult guardianship. Yet
there remains some scope for decision-making of a legal nature—such as
contracting with public and private nursing service providers—to constitute a
duty of supervision. It is through this creation of a care plan and environment
that a framework for preventing harm to third parties emerges. Furthermore,
for Justice Otani, the duty of supervision is given its contours by factors such
as the duty of good management imposed upon guardians in the Civil Code.135
This in turn explains how the concept of fault can be reintroduced into
caregiver liability, where the precedents had been moving effectively towards
no-fault liability.
131
132

MINPŌ arts. 840, 843, amended by Law No. 94 of 2013.
See generally Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled, Law No. 123 of 1950

(Japan).
133

See Seinen kōken kankei jiken no gaikyō [Overview of Adult Guardianship Cases], SAIBANSHO WEB,
http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/kouken/index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
134
MINPŌ art. 858.
135
See id. arts. 644, 852.
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Justice Kiuchi, however, proposed an alternative argument to counter
the issues raised by Justice Otani. Specifically, Justice Kiuchi asserted that
managers of care institutions have a legal duty to supervise due to their limited
authority to restrain, which is granted under the Mental Health Act. Indeed,
he noted that the potential incentives to restrain are an additional reason to not
regard family members and guardians as bearing a legal duty to supervise. If
the law imposed on guardians a duty to protect third parties, not only would
the law create an excessive burden on protectors by requiring constant
attention, it would also be inimical to the best interest of the protected.
Having established that a spouse does not by law bear a duty to
supervise, the joint judgment laid out the principles defining an assumed duty
to supervise. It held that the liability in section 714 could arise if, in the
context of the relationship and involvement with the person without mental
capacity, there were special circumstances where the supervisor’s duty had
been assumed in a manner that exceeded simple supervisory activity and was
directed at preventing harm to third parties. This question is to be resolved
objectively by:
[T]ak[ing] into comprehensive consideration various
circumstances . . . including whether said person has a
relationship of being a relative of the mentally disabled person
and how close their relationship is, whether they live together
and how frequently they have daily contact, how said person is
involved in the administration of the property of the mentally
disabled person and other circumstances concerning said
person’s involvement in the affairs related to the mentally
disabled person, the physical and mental conditions of the
mentally disabled person and whether and how the mentally
disabled person shows problematic behavior in everyday life,
and the actual care given by said person to the mentally disabled
person depending on these factors.136
These criteria are to be weighed “from the viewpoint of equity” while
considering whether “it is possible and easy for said person to conduct
supervision.”137 To counteract the incentives to restrain that would otherwise
exist, Justice Kiuchi emphasized that the degree of difficulty entailed in the
136

Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2016, Hei 26 (ju) no. 1434, 70 MINSHŪ 681, translated in Judgments of the Supreme
Court: 2014 (Ju) 1434, supra note 125.
137
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supervision is a crucial factor. Applying these criteria to the wife and adult
son, the joint judgment found that there were no such special circumstances
because the wife could not be expected to prevent harm to third parties due to
her own physical disability and the son was not physically proximate.
Justices Okabe and Otani in separate judgments disagreed with the joint
judgment as to whether the adult son had assumed the duty to supervise, but
found that this duty had been met anyway. For Justice Okabe, supervision
could be assumed by creating a care plan and environment whereby harm to
third parties is avoided and the day-to-day restraint which is necessarily part
of supervision is delegated to others. The care plan in this case provided
supervised outlets for the desire to wander through daily outings to either
institutional care or surrounding streets accompanied by the wife or daughterin-law. Rooted in a perceived sense of responsibility as eldest son, the adult
son was centrally involved in this care plan. Moreover, it was apparent that,
by trialing restraints in the form of locking outer doors and installing sensors,
the adult son had made efforts to prevent harm to others. Applying the criteria
of the joint judgment, these factors amounted to special circumstances to the
effect that the adult son had assumed the duty of supervision. Nevertheless,
Justice Okabe held that this duty was acquitted. The criteria to be used in
determining this includes a variety of factors, such as foreseeability and the
scope of the ability to prevent the harm. As a non-professional, the standard
of care for the adult son was that of an ordinary reasonable person. While the
wandering was foreseeable, it was an unreasonable demand to require that he
install functioning sensors at the exits to the house. The adult son did not
therefore neglect his duty to supervise.
Justice Otani, who regarded an adult guardian as having a duty to
supervise, agreed with Justice Okabe’s conclusion. Considering the criteria
typically used by family courts upon appointing an adult guardian (which
were influenced by Civil Code obligations of mutual care within the family),
the adult son was a prime candidate. The son was in the position to arrange a
care plan and that the son did indeed play a central role in this respect
regardless of his lack of proximity. The son could therefore be said to have
assumed the duty of supervision. The content of this duty aligns with the
supervisory duty of an adult guardian. That the scope of this duty is narrower
than the pre-2000 position will, Justice Otani added, go some way to
reconciling the principles to be applied here with contemporary social
expectations. On this standard, the son could be said to have been exempted
from the presumption. Not maintaining a sensor, which was originally
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intended for customers anyway, did not detract from what was a praiseworthy
care plan and environment.
Ultimately, the Nagoya Train Accident Case held that the caregivers in
the case were not liable. However, the path taken to reach this conclusion
differed in a number of respects among the judges. While in the domestic
context, this leaves several points of law unsettled, the diversity of opinion
provides greater depth for comparison with current and potential common law
approaches to the issue.
V.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CAREGIVER LIABILITY

The juxtaposition of common law and civil law approaches to the
liability in tort of persons with mental impairment and their caregivers
highlights difficult and unresolved questions of principle, policy, and
doctrine. The imposition of civil liability on a person who is mentally
impaired is problematic, but equally so is immunity from liability given
presumptions of capacity under the CRPD. However that question is resolved,
the key follow-up question for any jurisdiction is the justification, if any, of
attributing sole or joint liability to a caregiver. This liability can be personal
or derivative, flowing from either a legal or assumed duty of supervision. The
content of this duty is also contestable in its scope toward the mentally
impaired person and, most controversially, toward third parties.
A.

Legal or Assumed Duty?

The location of these principles within a code seems to place a
considerable restraint on doctrinal development of the issue in civil law
jurisdictions. However, this difference should not be overstated. Case law
can develop codes in unexpected and contested directions. The reasoning of
the different judges in the Japanese judicial system above is reminiscent of
the common law uncertainty evident in Emery, for example, where the Court
was undecided on whether parents of an adult child were liable for third-party
harm based on their parental status or because they assumed supervision of
the adult child upon his release from an institution.138 It would seem that in
both the United States and the United Kingdom, there is potential for liability
in either situation. In Japan, the wording of the provisions requires that
analysis begins with identifying the person with a legal duty to supervise and
138
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then, if this duty cannot be acquitted, a person who has assumed the duty. Yet
opinions within the Japanese Supreme Court diverge as to who, if anybody,
bears this legal duty.
The justifications for making no assumption that a spouse or other
family member (other than a parent of a minor) bears a supervisory or
caregiver’s duty are consistent with contemporary values shared across
jurisdictions. Justice Kiuchi’s reasoning for regarding care institutions
authorized to restrain as having this duty are compelling, in that informal
caregivers and guardians should not be regarded as wielding this authority
(though institutional authority too is increasingly subject to scrutiny). In an
age where volunteers and professionals are filling vacuums in families caused
by demographic change, the view that an adult guardian should bear a legal
supervisory duty, albeit in a narrower sense than in the past, also holds some
merit. Ultimately, however, there may not be a care institution or guardian
available. In many cases, therefore, the analysis will automatically begin with
whether there is a party who can be said to have assumed a duty of
supervision.
B.

Duty to Third Parties?

If the assumption of a duty of supervision is the primary basis for thirdparty liability, another unresolved question is how precisely a duty to
supervise generates a protective role toward third parties. It may be fruitful
to draw an analogy with the liability of parents for the acts of minors, and
indeed this is regulated by the same provision in Japan (section 714) because,
depending on the child’s maturity, a minor may not have the mental capacity
required for tortious liability. The Supreme Court of Japan held in 2015 that
a parent’s duty of supervision includes a duty to direct the child to take care
not to cause harm to others when beyond the parent’s direct supervision. The
parent meets this duty, and therefore avoids parental liability, if the act that
causes harm is not generally considered dangerous (in that case, kicking a
soccer ball in an enclosed area) unless there are special circumstances that
give rise to a specific foreseeable danger. Yet the analogy between parents of
minors and caregivers of mentally impaired adults breaks down due to the
differences between a developing child, who becomes a full citizen under the
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tutelage of his or her parents, and a person with mental impairment, who is
not clearly under any tutelage at all and is certainly not an “ex-citizen.”139
As highlighted from the analysis of the common law position in Part II,
one argument for how a non-paternalistic supervisory duty could generate a
protective duty to third parties is that the two duties are inextricably
connected. At the very least, the duties overlap: where there is an apparent
danger posed by a person with a mental impairment, taking protective action
such as notifying authorities or taking the mentally impaired person to a doctor
may meet both duties simultaneously. This position is reflected in the Nagoya
High Court’s rejection of a stand-alone duty to third parties. Rather,
preventing trespass and other third-party property violations was related to the
duty to prevent harm to the mentally impaired person in cases where that
person has little spatial awareness and expresses a desire to wander. Not
causing harm to another can also be considered one of the mentally impaired
person’s interests in both of Ronald Dworkin’s senses: experiential, that is in
the present moment, and critical, namely authoring one’s own life.140
The theoretical interdependence of these duties is also supported in the
adult guardianship literature. Associate Professor Bruce Jennings provides a
choice of models to conceptualize restrictions on the autonomy of sufferers of
dementia.141 The first is the Public Health Model, “a regulatory basis in which
the interests of others in not being harmed override the liberty interest of the
individual.”142 This model is consistent with Mill’s ‘harm principle’ that only
harm to others justifies state interference with individual liberty and involves
the concomitant difficulties in defining harm. 143 More concerning for
Jennings, given the fluctuating nature of an individual’s dementia, is the
tendency of this model to view persons “categorically rather than
situationally” due to the “large populations, statistical risks, and impersonal
factors” inherent in its focus.144
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For accidents in the presence of the parent, it is more likely that direct liability will arise for the
parent under MINPŌ art. 709. This is also true for caretakers and adult guardians (in common law
jurisdictions), but does not assist in matters such as the Nagoya Train Accident Case where wandering was
involved.
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The second model is the Guardianship Model. Traditionally, this legal
tool for substituted decision making has come into effect upon the loss of an
individual’s capacity.145 While it has traditionally been justified by
paternalism towards the individual rather than concern for public welfare, it
can have an indirect effect on public safety.146 Yet Jennings is skeptical of
this model as a means of locating appropriate interventions in the lives of
persons with dementia in the name of public safety because this model tends
to view capacity as an all or nothing concept.147 In addition to the danger of
overriding autonomy excessively in the name of “best interests,” Jennings
argues that the model is less useful for problematic behaviors at early stages
of dementia.148
In many respects, the Japanese position embodies the Guardianship
Model. Yet one might think that it was instead informed by a Public Health
Model if one were to go by the reaction of the mass media and care
professionals to the High Court decision.149 It was widely argued that the
ruling would push dementia sufferers back into institutional care or create
incentives for excessive physical restraints at home,150 and further isolation of
families already suffering the stigma of dementia.151 Of the estimated 4.4
million dementia sufferers in Japan, 2.8 million use services under the new
Long-Term Care Insurance, and half of these users reside outside of
institutional care in the community152—a rapidly growing proportion.153 This
145
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is not always a matter of choice. The waiting list for “special” aged care
nursing homes, entry to which has strict means and merits tests, has reportedly
reached 500,000 people.154 In this context, sections of the media criticized the
High Court for failing to demonstrate an understanding of the complexity of
caring for sufferers of dementia—which includes fluctuating capacity,
challenging behaviors such as wandering, and the resulting strain155—and was
therefore unrealistic in expecting 24-hour supervision on the part of a
caregiver for the sake of public safety.156
Some of these criticisms were misdirected. The High Court’s precise
words were that it is “necessary to have an awareness of the [person’s]
activities to the extent that those activities do not cause physical harm were
the person to disappear unnoticed.”157 While this seems to endorse the use of
monitoring technologies such as sensors, it was tempered by a proportionality
test focused on the interests of the person under care. The High Court held
that the permissible extent to which the freedom of a person “without mental
capacity” could be restrained by a caregiver to prevent harm is “reasonable
methods to oversee [the person’s] behavior, and restrain or supervise this
behavior to the extent necessary, in order to prevent physical harm to that
person from unsupervised wandering.”158 This point was not overruled on
appeal: Justice Okabe of the Supreme Court also assumed that day-to-day
restraint is necessarily part of protective supervision.
The Guardianship Model is therefore consistent with the notion that
third-party liability is premised on protection of the mentally impaired person.
However, as is evident in the Nagoya Train Accident Case, this model can
signal a norm of confinement. Furthermore, regardless of any test of
proportionality, the Guardianship Model tends to employ a binary concept of
capacity that is divorced from the question of individual functionality in a
specific context.

154

Ninchishō haikai jiko, chiiki de sasaeru mimamoru shikumi o [Dementia Wandering Accidents:
Towards a System of Support and Protection in the Community], KAHOKU SHINPŌ, June 2, 2014.
155
See, e.g., 70-sai tsuma wa naze 90-sai otto o sashita no ka: rōrō kaigo 15-nen no “jigoku”, kuzureta
tsuma no “seishin baransu” [Why Did a 70-year-old Wife Stab Her 90-year-old Husband? 15 Years of
“Hell” as an Old-Age Caregiver and the “Psychological Imbalance” of a Broken-Down Wife], SANKEI
NYŪSU (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.sankei.com/west/news/140124/wst1401240103-n2.html.
156
See Opinion Letter, Alzheimer’s Ass’n Japan, supra note 151.
157
Nagoya High Ct., Apr. 24, 2014, Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB 1, http://www.courts.go.jp.
158
Id.

April 2018

Whose Fault in an Aging World?

443

The problem is, therefore, whether third-party liability can be generated
through a caring relationship that is not premised on paternalism, a denial of
capacity, and potentially confinement. Such liability might be justified under
the Conservator Model, which focuses on the care relationship and the
importance of creating the support for a mentally impaired person to continue
to flourish. This support may entail providing alternative avenues to express
individual identity to those that have become problematic behaviors (for
example, driving, cooking, or wandering).159 One of the advantages of this
model, according to Jennings, is that it creates opportunities for greater
government, professional, and community involvement in activities that
reintegrate persons with dementia into society.160 This has inherent value,
may slow the onset of dementia,161 and can promote public safety through
individual care and support. The Conservator Model is the model most
capable of promoting public safety in a manner that is consistent with modern
notions of supported decision making and the rights of persons with
disabilities.
A central focus upon the care relationship and the person with a mental
impairment has two implications for caregiver liability. First, caregiver duties
should proceed from the fact of the relationship rather than any preconceived,
anachronistic notion of who should provide that care. The duty should
therefore be assumed voluntarily, independent of any statutory duty to provide
care. Second, interventions should be supportive rather than motivated by
mere containment. This in turn has implications for the use of psychotropic
drugs and physical restraints, including new technologies such as GPS
bracelets and surveillance via the Internet that, where involuntary, represent
significant incursions on autonomy and may have counter-productive
therapeutic outcomes.162 While an objection may be that a mentally impaired
person could pose a threat to public safety, authority to restrain would lie
instead in its standard repository, namely the police and like bodies,
authorized (and restricted) by law for the specific purpose of preventing
imminent harm to others.163 On this point, Richards predicts that greater
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incidence of accidents would likely create the political conditions for police
to be resourced more adequately to perform this role.164
In addition to adequately resourced police, the Conservator Model
cannot operate without other social supports. This includes government
programs providing services and education to facilitate a higher level of
function in the community on the part of persons with mental impairment and
greater capacity in the community for identification and management of risks,
role-allocation, and decision-making processes relating to care and
supervision.165 Civil society, businesses, and local governments can play
important roles. For example, in December 2013, Fukuoka City established
a “wandering elderly search e-mail” (haikai kōreisha sagashite mēru) system
calling on citizens to assist in searching for missing persons. As of 2014, there
were 2793 volunteers and 571 businesses registered.166 As of 2016, about half
of Japan’s local government authorities have signed agreements with
consumer co-operatives to enlist their efforts in keeping an eye on their
members in the community with dementia.167 Further public support of such
programs may be needed to ensure their viability and instigation where they
cannot easily be expected to emerge spontaneously at a community level.168
And yet these incipient programs demonstrate that, given the right
environment, problematized behaviors such as wandering can be transformed
into legitimate, purposeful behaviors that may obviate the need for restraints
much of the time.
In a sense, the growing supportive environment provided by both public
and private bodies is a partial rediscovery of traditional family and communal
bonds that performed a protective function in the past, the loss of which is the
heart of the problem, rather than dementia itself. This is not to suggest that
the considerable social dislocation that has occurred through demographic
change and urbanization in post-industrial societies can be reversed. The
possibility of modern collective approaches to behaviors such as wandering
164
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does, however, have a bearing on questions of fairness and reasonableness.
For example, there is a growing body of law in Japan addressing accidents
suffered by the elderly and those with disabilities.169 The trend is for courts
to impose reasonable standards of safety on everyday facilities, products, and
residences based on the diverse level of physical and mental ability of those
using the services.170 An important landmark in this respect was the Japanese
Diet’s enactment in 2013 of the Act on the Elimination of Disability
Discrimination.171 This evolving expectation that society should be livable
for all persons, even the physically and mentally infirm, should also inform
the level of restraint required to acquit a caregiver’s duty. There are echoes
of this view in the Nagoya High Court’s remarks on the social responsibility
of the railway company to facilitate a safe environment for all.
The Conservator Model shifts the focus to prevention rather than
redress, but accidents will sometimes occur nonetheless. In such cases, tort
law may be the least efficient and equitable form of dispute resolution. The
arguments for retaining tort law as a mechanism for compensating negligent
harm—such as emphasizing the deterrent effect or the moral aspect of fault—
are weaker, just as the arguments for alternative mechanisms better equipped
to provide compensation are stronger. Litigation trends in Japan reflect a
growing awareness that dementia in particular creates challenges for an
adversarial approach. On the one hand, JR Kyushu and Nishi Nippon Railway
have stated that while they will respond to each case individually, in principle
they will claim for damages for train accidents because it is impractical for
the railways to determine whether a passenger has dementia or not.172 On the
other hand, in 2007, Kanrin City in Gunma Prefecture decided not to claim
for costs against a family amounting to 10 million yen in living costs over
169
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seven years for the institutional care of a woman with dementia while her
identity remained unknown.173 The Mayor explained that the decision not to
enforce filial duties in the Civil Code was taken from a “humanistic
perspective” (jindōteki kenchi) and the view that dementia was a collective
problem.174 Alternatively, where fairness demands compensation, some
commentators have proposed the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms such as conciliation as a future alternative to litigation.175 A
similar trend can be seen in criminal law, especially as prisons become
populated increasingly with the elderly. For example, in a 2013 shoplifting
case, the accused, who suffered dementia, was found not guilty and
prosecutors opted not to appeal the District Court’s verdict.176
As an alternative means of redress, socialized mechanisms for
compensation like no-fault liability insurance schemes may obviate the
unenviable task for courts of allocating loss among victims, mentally impaired
tortfeasors, and their caregivers. A state-sponsored or cooperative insurance
system would also provide redress for victims, and would be justified by the
fact that dementia is a risk faced by every member of the community. 177 In
many jurisdictions it is already possible to contract for individual
compensation liability insurance as part of motor vehicle and disaster
insurance. However, some argue that risk-sharing regimes at a public and
community level should be considered because it is not always clear whether
events such as railway accidents are covered and the commercial viability of
these schemes could be threatened if claimants increased proportionately to
the expected increase in dementia.178 Cooperative insurance schemes that
exist for people with intellectual disabilities in Japan could be a suitable
model.179 Alternatively, funds could be dedicated from state welfare schemes,
such as the Japanese Long-Term Nursing Insurance, just as they are for
funding adult guardianship promotion activities.180
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CONCLUSION

As modern societies age, it is inevitable that accidents involving
persons with dementia will increase and come before the courts. In many
cases, the solution will lie outside the judicial system, whether through
preventative strategies such as collective community support and education
for caregivers, or solutions that redistribute harm collectively through means
such as insurance. Without these alternatives, tort law will remain an option
for resolving civil disputes where a mentally impaired person has caused
harm. The Conservator Model, with its focus on the care relationship and
reintegration into the community, may allow for third-party liability to be
derived from a relationship of care or supervision.
The Article argues that this form of liability should be considered, but
only under the following conditions. First, an assessment of liability should
presume that the mentally impaired person has the capacity for responsibility,
but that other parties have a role in supporting the person to exercise this
capacity. Liability should flow from this supportive role, rather than a
protective duty. Caregiver liability should be premised upon the notion that
preventing third-party harm is integral to this supportive care relationship.
Second, caregiver liability should only arise where a person has voluntarily
assumed this supervisory role and is, as a result, in a unique position to assess
and identify risks. Third, liability should arise not from a failure to restrain,
but only from a failure to take steps to avoid potentially dangerous behaviors
through support, diversions, or contacting the authorities in extreme cases.
Fourth, liability should be premised on a supportive external care and living
environment in the community even where this does not yet exist. Finally,
the question of whether a caregiver has breached his or her duty of care could
draw from the broad contextual criteria employed by the Supreme Court of
Japan as applied to the particular facts. This would ensure a role for
community standards to interact with legal tests of proportionality in a way
that would likely place an appropriately high threshold on establishing
caregiver liability. A flexible model of liability predicated on a subjective
appraisal of the mentally impaired person’s capacity and the potential for
some form of caregiver liability provides the best among problematic
candidates for compensation of victims for the acts of persons with a mental
impairment such as wandering. Caregiver liability should, however, be
premised upon the central position of the rights and interests of the person
under care, the voluntariness of the care relationship, and a standard of care
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that anticipates collective support for caregivers in the community, obviating
the need for restraints in the name of paternalism or public safety.

